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A Test of Prospective Voting in 
House Elections Using Leading 
Economic Indicators 
Joseph P. McGar rity* 
University of Central Arkansas 
This paper tests whether voters are retrospective (backward 
looking) or prospective (forward looking). Previously, survey 
data has been used to measure future expectations. This paper is 
innovative because it measures future expectations with leading 
economic indicators used in the economic forecasting literature. 
I find that at the polls voters consider both past economic per-
formance as well as expected future economic performance. I 
find that when election results are specified with actual wins and 
losses, voters put more weight on past and current conditions 
than they do on future expectations. However, when results are 
measured with vote share, voters seem to give past and future 
expectations equal weight. 
A substantial literature seeks to ascertain whether macroe-conomic conditions influence election results. Generally, scholars agree on a framework which tests whether vot-
ers reward politicians in the president's party for good economic 
times, while punishing them for poor economic times. This work 
assumes that voters have trouble monitoring the government's 
part in managing the economy, mostly because these government 
actions are not readily observable. However, voters do observe 
actual economic conditions and they can use macroeconomic 
performance as a crude proxy for the government's competence 
in managing the economy. Good policies are more likely to result 
• I would like to thank Dan Sutter, Marc Poitas, and George Krause for valuable com -
ments . 
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in good economic times, while poor policies are more likely to 
result in downturns . Of course , the economy fluctuates for rea-
sons that have nothing to do with government policy, creating 
some imprecision when voters attribute credit or blame. 
However, there is a lively debate over what time period vot-
ers consider when holding politicians accountable . On one side 
of the controversy, the retrospective voter theory assumes voters 
consi der recent macroeconomic or recent personal fmancial per-
forman ce. On the other side of the disagreement , the prospective 
vote r theory holds that voters are forward looking and when they 
vote, they reward or punish politicians based on their expecta-
tions about the future macroeconomic economy or their future 
pers onal wealth. The literature , reviewed below, has produced 
eviden ce on both sides of the debate . 
Research by Duch, Palmer, and Anderson (2000) has raised 
serious questions about the approach used to measure future ex-
pecta tions when testing the prospective theory. Typically, future 
economic conditions are measured with survey data, which Pal-
mer found were biased and not representative of general macroe-
con omic conditions. Surveys also suffer from another well-
known problem; they only provide a limited amount of informa-
tion about economic expectations. People are forced to answer 
questi ons that do not measure the magnitude of an expected eco-
nomi c change. Therefore , even if people have concrete expecta-
tions about the future, the surveys used fail to capture this 
information. 
Given the problems with survey data, another approach is 
wort h considering. This paper takes a first step in this direction 
by drawing on the economic forecasting literature to identify 
leading economic indicators . It seems reasonable that leading 
indica tors are our best measure of aggregate economic expecta-
tions. Indeed , leading indicators have been used to predict future 
econ omic conditions for some time. Further, a rational voter will 
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use the best information available to form their expectations and 
these leading indicators can be used as a useful proxy for voter 
expectations . 
This paper follows Estella and Mishkin (1998) who identify 
the stock market and the interest rate spread between securities 
with different terms to maturity as the two best leading indica-
tors. These two variables have a significant advantage over sur-
vey data designed to elicit expectations. When people answer 
survey questions, they have nothing at stake and are, therefore, 
unlikely to take their answers seriously. However, the stock mar-
ket and interest rates move based on decisions that people make 
with money. Since these decisions have monetary consequences, 
people will take them much more seriously. 
This paper adds these two leading economic indicators to a 
retrospective model of voting that allows voters to settle up in 
House elections for the President's party 's performance. It finds 
evidence that past economic performance and expected future 
economic performance both play a roll in the electoral success of 
Presidential Party incumbents. Voters seem to be more retrospec-
tive when elections are measured with wins and losses, while 
they balance retrospective and prospective considerations more 
· evenly when elections are measured with vote share. 
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
A retrospective voter considers only past and current infor-
mation when evaluating an incumbent politician or party. This 
theory can trace its origins to Downs (1957) who wrote: "There-
fore, we believe it is more rational for him [the voter] to ground 
his voting decisions on current events rather than future ones" 
( 40). Much earlier and in a context that had nothing to do with 
voting, Keynes (1964) wrote that people use current conditions 
to form economic expectations: 
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It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to at-
tach great weight to matters which are very uncertain . It 
is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable 
degree by the facts about which we feel somewhat confi-
dent, even though they may be less decisively relevant to 
the issue than other facts about which our knowledge is 
scanty . For this reason the facts of the existing situation 
enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the formation of 
our long term expectations; our usual practice being to 
take the existing situation and to project it into the future 
(148). 
The subsequent retrospective voter literature has noted that 
an ill-informed electorate will have trouble understanding the 
implications of different government policies and know little of 
the economic competence of political candidates. However, 
people can gain insight into the ability of an incumbent by ob-
serving the actual state of the economy. This is a crude way to 
measure a government's competence. Even though voters who 
do not consider future expectations can be fooled by an incum-
bent politician, all incumbent politicians have an incentive to try 
and fool the electorate by priming the pump sp the economy 
peaks at election time. Competent incumbents will be more suc-
cessful in manipulating the economy both in general and to im-
prove their electoral fortunes when they face reelection. 
Therefore, competent incumbents are more likely to be reelected 
than less able politicians.' 
In the first important empirical study on this topic, Kramer 
(1971) finds growth in real per-capita income and inflation are 
statistically important in explaining House election results. Kra-
mer held that the President's party was the governing party and 
House elections were a performance evaluation . His basic pre-
1 See Fiorina (1978) or more recently for a good discussion see Lohmann (1999). 
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mise was that members of his team were more likely to win elec-
tions when economic conditions were favorable. The studies that 
have followed Kramer by using vote share to gauge electoral 
success have produced conflicting results. Tufte (1975, 1973) 
and Jacobson (1990) find evidence of a retrospective voter. 
However, Stigler (1973), Erickson (1988, 1990), Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1989), Alesina, Rosenthal and Londregan (1993), and 
Chappell and Suzuki (1993) all find little or no evidence that 
past or current economic conditions matter at election time. 
When seat swing is the dependent variable, Lewis-Beck and 
Rice (1984) and Oppenheimer, Stimson and Waterman (1986, 
1991) find the economy is influential in election results, while 
Campbell (1986, 1997) finds that they are not. Finally, when a 
return rate of Presidential Party incumbents is used as a depen-
dent variable, Grier and McGarrity (1998, 2002) find strong evi-
dence that the election year measures of inflation, unemployment 
and the growth in real per-capita income all influence elections 
as the retrospective model would suggest. That is, favorable re-
sults are rewarded and unfavorable results are punished. 
There have been two main motivations attributed to voters in 
the retrospective voter literature. The first is that people vote 
their "pocket books." That is, they perceive their own economic 
well being and assign credit or blame for their fortunes to the 
incumbent President's party. The second motivation, called soci-
otropic voting, holds that people vote based on the current condi-
tions of the whole country (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979).2 
The various specifications of the election results equations, 
which all include macroeconomic variables, are consistent with 
2 Various off-shoots of the sociotropic theory have sprung up. Mutz and Mondale (1997) 
claim people vote in the best interests of a group (such as Black, Hispanic , female) rather 
the country ' s best interest. Shah et al. (1999) claim that media coverage of economic 
news may explain sociotropic voting . Gomez (2001) claims voters ' levels of "sophistica-
tion" detennines whether they are motivated by pocketbook or sociotropic concerns . 
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either motivation. The macroeconomic variables are relevant to a 
sociotropic voter. These variables also represent an aggregation 
of everyone' s individual pocketbook. For instance, a high growth 
rate in personal per-capita income will result from individuals 
with growing income. 
PROSPECTIVE VOTING 
Just like the retrospective voting model rested on Keynes 
theory of how people make expectations about the future of the 
economy, the prospective voting model takes its inspiration from 
the Rational Expectations (RE) literature. In RE, people make 
decisions based on their expected future benefits and expected 
future costs. They are forward looking. Further, they have incen-
tives to use information concerning the likelihood of future 
events to form their expectations and make their decisions. The 
prospective model claims people judge incumbent politicians 
based on what they expect to happen, not what has already oc-
curred. That is, a voter judges a politician by the expected per-
formance of the economy, not the actual performance. 
DIFFERENTIATING 
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE VOTING 
Many studies have attempted to determine which voter mod-
el better explains the dynamics of electoral discipline. The issue 
is far from resolved. The dominant approach has been to explain 
Presidential approval with responses to surveys conducted by the 
University of Michigan Survey Research Center. MacKuen , 
Erikson, and Stimson (1992) report that expectations about gen-
eral business conditions over the next five years are important in 
explaining Presidential popularity; this suggests prospective vot-
ing . Norpoth (1996) finds that voters are retrospective when va-
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riables for scandal, war, and changes in the White House are 
added to the Presidential popularity equation.3 
CALL FOR A NEW APPROACH 
The surveys used to measure past and future expectations 
give only a limited amount of information. People respond to 
questions and are forced to give a dichotomous answer. For in-
stance, will the economy be better in one year then it is now? A 
yes answer does not measure the magnitude of the expectation. 
Someone who thinks the economy will grow at an unprecedented 
rate is treated the same as someone who thinks the economy will 
do just marginally better. This lost information may lead to some 
of the conflicting results in the literature. 
Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) identify another problem 
with the survey data. They claim that aggregated survey data is 
not very representative of objective economic conditions. They 
note that when voters respond to survey data, their responses are 
influenced by things such as their media exposure, life expe-
riences, political attitudes, and various demographic variables. In 
a series of tests, they find that these other influences create a sys-
tematic bias in the aggregated survey data of economic percep-
tions. That is, the noise of the individual level data is not random 
and does not cancel out when aggregated. 
' When Michigan survey information is used to explain voter preferences in Congres-
sional elections , the results remained mixed. Fiorina (1978) finds no evidence of retros-
pective voting between 1956 and 1974, while Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) find such evi-
dence . 
Haller and Norpoth (1994) try to explain what information people use to form expecta-
tions by testing whether people make adaptive or rational expectations . In the first type of 
expectation, people use past information to form their expectations of the future and 
would be retrospective voters . In the second type of expectation, people use all the infor-
mation available to them including economic forecasts and would be prospective voters. 
These authors find that people use past information to forecast inflation and forecasts of 
general business conditions do not seem to fit either expectations model. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
A TEST FOR PROSPECTIVE VOTING IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 61 
FORECASTS OF GENERAL BUSINESS CONDITIONS 
Instead of looking at survey data, this paper looks at direct 
measures that forecast the future economic conditions. The most 
well-known measure of future economic conditions is the Trea-
sury Department's composite index of leading economic indica-
tors . Also, Stock and Watson have a rival index of leading 
economic indicators. However, these indexes are not very useful 
for this study since they start in 1959, and the election data sam-
ple used in this paper goes back to 1916. Further, the literature 
on economic forecasting suggests that these leading composite 
indexes are not the best predictors of future economic conditions. 
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) find that the difference in interest 
rates between government bonds with different maturity lengths 
as well as stock prices are the best indicators of a future reces-
sion. Using in sample estimates, as well as out of sample predic-
tions, they conclude that adding additional explanatory variables 
does not help the predictive power of their estimates. They note 
that the Stock and Watson Index may not add much useful in-
formation because it is formed in part with the yield curve. 
A rich literature backs up the predictive power of the stock 
market. The link between stock price and the expected future 
fortunes of a firm are well known. A stock price is the present 
value of expected future earnings per share of stock . Since the 
price of a stock is many multiples of current earnings, most of 
the price reflects the present value of earnings many years into 
the future. 4 
4 For example, on January 17, 2003 the price earnings ratio of the firms in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average was 22.01 (Wall Street Journal , C-2). To continue consider one firm, 
on Tuesday, January 21, 2003, Yahoo Finance reports that Microsoft has a PIE ratio of 
29.57. Since they report that the consensus earnings per share estimate was 2.01 in 2003 
and 2. I 6 in 2004, relatively similar figures, the bulk of the share price (almost 30 times 
earnings) must come from expectations formed about earnings several years in the future. 
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Broad measures of the stock market capture the earnings of 
so many firms that they rise and fall with expectations of the ex-
pected future macroeconomic conditions. 
As early as 1938, Mitchell and Burns (1938) used a Dow 
Jones composite index as a leading indicator of macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Fama (1990) finds that real common stock returns 
are a leading indicator of capital expenditures, the real rate of 
return on capital, and the rate of change in real GNP. Schwert 
(1990) found that Fama's results hold up over 100 years of data. 
Bong-Soo Lee (1992) reports that real stock returns lead growth 
in industrial production. Using data sets that start as early as 
1891, Barro (1990) finds that changes in real stock market prices 
precede by one year the changes in the growth in expenditures 
on capital goods. · 
The interest rate spread seems to be the best leading predic-
tor of future conditions. It is simply the interest rate difference 
between a long and short term security. The idea is that the term 
structure of interest rates contains valuable information about 
economic expectations that other leading indicators can not cap-
ture. One explanation is that the interest rate spread can convey 
information about the current monetary policy. When the Federal 
Reserve has a tight monetary policy, short term rates will rise 
more than long term rates, reducing the interest rate spread. The 
high short term interest rate will be very likely to produce an 
economic downturn in the near term. (Bernanke and Blinder 
1992). Or alternatively, a loose monetary policy will cause short 
term rates to fall more than long term interest rates, increasing 
the interest rate spread. The low short term rates may cause the 
economy to expand. 5 
5 Also, the long tenn rate can be thought of as an equilibrium short term rate. Monetary 
policy can cause the short term rate to deviate from its equilibrium affecting the yield 
curve which will usefully capture the direction of monetary policy. 
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Another complementary explanation is that the interest rate 
spread also considers long tenn expectations. The long term in-
terest rate contains expectation of the real interest rate as well as 
expected inflation. Since inflation and real output growth often 
move together with output leading inflation, the expected infla-
tion part of the long term interest rate may provide information 
about the economy's future growth rate (see Estrella and Mish-
kin 1998, Mishkin 1990). 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) write that the difference be-
tween the yields of the 10 year government bond and three 
month T-bill can successfully predict future real GNP growth one 
and half to four years into the future.6 Laurent (1989) also finds 
the spread useful in predicting real GNP growth. He defines the 
spread as the difference between (1) a spliced series of rates for 
the 20-year and the 30-year Treasury Notes and (2) the Federal 
Funds Rate. Estrella and Mishkin (1998) and Dueker (1997) 
found the interest rate spread was the best leading indicator of a 
. 7 
recession. 
The stock market and interest rates have several advantages 
as leading indicators that survey data can not match. First, the 
stock market and interest rates convey information about the 
magnitude of positive or negative expectations about future gen-
eral business conditions. They may indicate more precise ex-
pected changes than the survey data was able to generate. 
Second, the stock market and interest rates reflect real choices 
that people made based on their expectations of the future which 
may improve their value as an indicator relative to survey infor-
mation. For instance, people are very likely to carefully consider 
6 This paper also finds that the interest rate spread forecasts future real GNP growth more 
accurately than surveys conducted by the American Statistical Association. 
1 For a complete review of the literature on the use of asset prices to forecast output see 
Stock and Watson (2003). 
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their opinion of future economic conditions before they buy or 
sell stock because this choice involves money. However, they are 
less likely to carefully consider their future expectations when 
they answer a questionnaire. In the later case, their choices have 
no economic consequences and they will not be as deliberate in 
signaling their expectations on a questionnaire as they will in the 
stock market. 
The work that is most closely related to this paper is Palmer 
and Whitten (1999). They create a retrospective model of voting 
but split current conditions up so that voters can consider ex-
pected and unexpected inflation and growth. However, their 
work differs from this paper because they are not looking at fu-
ture expected economic variables, but rather the component of 
present conditions that were unexpected. 
LEADING ECONOMIC INDICATOR VARIABLES 
The election data employed in this study goes back to 1916 
which was chosen because it is the first election after the Federal 
Reserve opened its doors. Therefore, the same institution is re-
sponsible for monetary policy over the whole sample period. 
Stock market information is readily available over the whole 
time period considered. A holding period return will capture 
whether stock prices have increased or decreased. I specify this 
variable as W1• which is the January to October holding period 
return of the deflated stock market index from the year of the 
election. I pick January as the beginning of the holding period 
since it is the start of the year of the election-the year from 
which most retrospective models draw their data. I end the pe-
riod in October since it is the month before the election. In an 
alternate specification, I also construct this variable as the hold-
ing period return in the year of the election (January to Decem-
ber). The Standard and Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) is employed 
to capture the stock performance of firms in the economy at 
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large. In the early part of the sample (until 1932), the stock price 
index is deflated with Warren and Pearson 's Wholesale Price 
Index (10-13). In the later part of the sample (after 1932), the 
stock price series is deflated by the Producer Price Index for All 
Comm odities compiled by Bureau of Labor Statistics , U.S . De-
partme nt of Labor. 
Interest rate data to calculate the slope of the yield curve is a 
litt le more difficult to obtain in the early years of the sample pe-
riod. The most popular interest rates used to calculate a spread 
are the ten-year Treasury Bond and the three-month Treasury 
Bill. Unf ortunately , data for the ten year bond only goes back to 
1959 and data the three-month T-bill starts in the 1930s. Re-
searche rs analyzing recent data have used U.S . government secu-
rity yields since their interest rates do not contain a premium for 
default risk. These securities are often referred to risk free assets 
since governments can always raise taxes to pay off interest ob-
ligations . 
Scholars that have used interest rate spreads to analyze earli-
er time periods have used private sector interest rates. Mankiw 
and Mir on (1986) use 3 and 6-month time rates from New York 
banks. Fama (1990) uses the yield on the AAA corporate bond 
portfo lio as the long rate and one-month treasury bill rate for the 
short rate. The AAA data was proprietary data from Ibbotson 
Associ ates and is not readily available . Taking a very similar ap-
proach, Schwert (1990) used AA yields and a one-month Trea-
sury yield. 
Schwert and Fama both mix government securities and cor-
porate securities to form their spreads . This may be somewhat 
prob lematic since the corporate yield contains some default risk 
and the government security contains none, or at least less. How-
ever, this problem is lessened since the default rate on the highly 
rated bonds is likely to be small. The AA series used by Schwert 
is useful in this study since it goes back to 1919 and allows me to 
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use most of my election data. I obtained the data for this series 
from the NBER historical macroeconomic variables data sets 
(1919 to 1964) and from the St. Louis Federal Reserve after 
1964. For my short rate I use the yield on six-month commercial 
paper. This has the advantage of being a corporate rate just like 
the Aa series and is available for the whole sample period. I ob-
tained this data from the NBER and Federal Reserve Board. I 
specify SPREAD as the ~ yield minus the 6-month commer-
cial paper yield. 
The next section adds the holding period return and 
SPREAD to a retrospective model of voting. I chose the Grier 
McGarrity model because it provides the most robust evidence 
of retrospective voting, ensuring an adequate control for the re-
trospective variables. Therefore, if the prospective variables are 
significant, they will be so when the retrospective model was 
considered in its best light. I also present results when a more 
familiar vote share model is employed. 
A RETROSPECTIVE MODEL 
This paper employs the Grier McGarrity (1998, 2002) model 
which assumed a retrospective voter and measured the econo-
my's performance with annual data from the year of the election. 
While some different specifications appear in the literature, the 
annual data is the most common. The dependent variable is the 
incumbent return rate from House members of the President's 
party . Members who died in office, resigned to run for another 
·elective office, took a cabinet position, judgeship, or another 
government job are excluded from the calculations. 
The Grier-McGarrity model employs two types of variables: 
economic performance variables and political variables. The first 
type are INCOME which is the growth rate of real personal in-
come in the year of the election; INFLATION which is the 
growth rate in the consumer price index in the year of the elec-
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tion; and UNEMPLOYMENT which is the unemployment rate 
in the year of the election . 
These economic variables are not perfect for capturing past 
conditions since just under two months of the information in the 
averages occurs after the election . However, this specification 
has been adopted since it is the dominate one in the literature. 
Furthe r, the variable that is most often included in economic 
models is INCOME and monthly data for this variable is not 
availab le for the early part of the sample. Additionally, the pros-
pective component of the variable will be minor since the aver-
age contains information from less than two months after the 
election. 
The post election future information contained in the varia-
ble is for a very short timy horizon. Also this information will be 
average d, lessening its influence. Finally, the short term yield 
used to calculate the SPREAD is a 6-month rate which is far 
enough into the future that on election day it does not overlap 
with the election year economic variables. 
The political variables are REDIST and INCPRES . 8 REDIST 
is a dummy variable that equals one in the first election after a 
redistric ting. This variable should negatively influence the in-
cumbent return rate for several reasons . First, states that lose 
seats will find incumbents running against each other. No matter 
who wins an incumbent will lose. In the states that gain seats, 
there are not enough incumbents available to fill each seat with 
an incumbent. Further, when the district lines are redrawn an 
incumbent has to seek votes from people who were never 
represen ted by this legislator before. Their former congressman 
would have taken credit for all the government actions that bene-
' The Grier-McGarrity Model has a dummy variable for presidential elections and this 
paper uses INCPRES to better capture the influence of coattails. 
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fited this district. The incumbent would have to start over build-
ing good will with people he has not represented before. · 
INCPRES is a dummy variable that equals one during an 
election when an incumbent President is running for re-election. 
President's often have coattails. This variable will measure the 
influence of Presidential reelections on House races. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables in the 
model just discussed. "Return Rate" is the return rate for all 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics: 1916-1996 
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max Dev. 
Return Rate 41 79.46 10.39 42.93 90.95 
Vote Share 41 62.82 5.51 47.62 75.45 
Income 41 2.12 5.88 -17.43 15.79 
UN 41 7.00 5.04 1.20 23.60 
Inflation 41 3.50 5.04 -10.39 16.52 
Wt (Jan.-Oct.) 41 0.03 0.16 -0.47 0.24 
Wt (Jan.-Dec.) 41 0.01 0.17 -0.52 0.33 
SPREAD (Jan .- Oct.) 39 3.31 4.06 -3.07 12.68 
SPREAD (Jan .- Dec.) 39 3.30 4.03 -2.95 12.31 
SPREAD (Oct.) 39 3.27 4.01 -3.32 10.91 
House incumbents in the President's party. "Vote Share" is the 
percentage of the two party vote for presidential Party incum-
ben_ts. The next three variables are the economic variables: In-
come, UN, and Inflation. "Wt" is various specifications of 
holding period returns. "SPREAD" is the long term yield minus 
the short term yield. Data definitions appear in Appendix A. 
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October monthly data. While the fourth estimate keeps the same 
holding period return, it specifies the spread with the yield in the 
month before the election (October). In this specification 
SPREAD gives the infom1ation from the yield curve at the time 
Table 2 
Impact of Economic Variables on Return Rates of 
Incumbent Members of President 's Party, 1916-1996 
I-statistics (in parentheses) calculated using Newey West Heteroskedasticity and Autocor-
relation Consistent standard errors with a lag truncation paramete r set at 3. 
Variables 
Constant 
Time trend 
Income 
Unemployment 
lnOation 
REDIST 
Incumbent President 
Wt (Jan.-Dec .) 
SPREAD (Jan.-Dec.) 
Wt (Jan .-Oct.) 
SPREAD (Jan.-Oct.) 
SPREAD (Oct.) 
1 
N•3 9 
59.89 
(4.20) 
0.29 
(1.93) 
0.94 
(5.41) 
-0.60 
(-2.49) 
-0.59 
(-2.32) 
-8.15 
(-2 .71) 
4.04 
(1.94) 
R2 0.58 
2 
N• 39 
66.95 
(2.25) 
0.18 
(0.52) 
0.93 
(4.19) 
-0.56 
(-2.28) 
-0.56 
(-2.28) 
-8.27 
(-2.72) 
3.84 
(1.92) 
8.52 
(I .36) 
0.33 
(0.44) 
0.61 
Return Rate 
3 4 
N•39 
67.94 
(2.32) 
0.18 
(0.51) 
0 .96 
(4.39) 
-0 .60 
(-2 .35) 
-0.57 
(-1.87) 
-8.07 
(-2 .70) 
3.93 
(1.88) 
N• 39 
69.24 
(4.8 1) 
0 .19 
(1.23) 
0.94 
(5.15) 
-0.53 
(-1.98) 
-0.48 
(-1.79) 
-8 .29 
(-2 .92) 
3.97 
(1.65) 
4.97 5.90 
(0.68) (0. 78) 
0.37 
(0.50) 
-0 .82 
(-1.09) 
5 
N-4 1 
55.80 
(4.44) 
0.33 
(2.47) 
0.81 
(4.34) 
-0.52 
(-2 .24) 
-0.53 
(-2.20) 
-8.13 
(-2 .65) 
3.18 
(1.38) 
10.48 
(1.86) 
6 
N• 4 1 
55.87 
(4 .53) 
0.34 
(2.64) 
0.85 
(4.34) 
0.59 
(-2.27) 
-0.66 
(-2 .87) 
-8.09 
(-2 .68) 
3.36 
(1.47) 
0.59 0.60 0.59 0.56 
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RESULTS 
Return Rates 
Table 2 contains the estimates of the model outlined above 
where the dependent variable is the return rate of Presidential 
Party incumbents in the House. 
Column one provides a starting point for our analysis. It rep-
licates the Grier-McGarrity model, containing the three retros-
pective economic variables, the political variables, and a time 
trend .9 All are significant at the 1 % level and move in the ex-
pected direction. These results suggest that voters weigh past 
economic performance when voting. 
In the next three columns, estimates are presented when var-
ious specifications of the two variables that capture economic 
expectations are added to the equation estimated in Column one. 
In column 2, we add Cl) the election year holding period return 
and C2) the interest rate spread, calculated using the annual aver-
age of monthly election year yields. Of the two prospective eco-
nomic variables, only the holding period return is significant at 
the 10% level Ct-statistic = 1.36), while the interest rate spread 
does not seem to be statistically important Ct-statistic = 0.4). The 
retrospective economic variables remain significant at conven-
tional levels with roughly similar coefficients . 
The next two columns estimate the model when the two 
forwar d looking variables are specified with the monthly data 
actua lly available to voters before the election, the January to 
9 Obviously, the model will not be appropriate indefinitely because it has a time trend and 
the dependent variable is capped at O and 100. However, the trend seems to capture the 
gradually increasing return rate over time. This trend is consistent with Polsby's (1968) 
classic finding that members of the House are increasingly considering their elected 
service as a career rather than a short visit. To see if the time trend created any undo 
problems in my sample, I looked at the predicted values for all the estimates reported in 
Tables 2 and 3. In every case the predicted values were less than 100. 
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of the election. However, in both estimates the economic va-
riables that capture expectations are insignificant at conventional 
levels. Toe largest t-statistic among these four estimated coeffi-
cients is -1.09. 
Nex t, I consider the specification that provided the most 
support for the forward looking variables which can be found in 
column 2. I drop the interest rate spread variable since it is clear-
ly not significant. I also add data from two elections at the be-
ginning of the sample that were dropped so the interest rate 
spread variable could be included in the estimate. With this vari-
able dropped, we are free to use our entire data set. Column 5 
presents these results. The influence of expected futur~ condi-
tions is small at the polls. The holding period return suggests that 
a one percent increase in the holding period return might raise 
the return rate from 79.46% to 79.47%, a very small increase 
indeed. 
To get a better idea of the relative magnitude of the influence 
of the prospective and retrospective economic variables consider 
a one standard deviation change in each economic variable in the 
direction that increases the return rate. Doing so shows that a 
typical change in the three retrospective economic variables have 
a larger influence on the return rate than does a typical change in 
the holding period return. That is, assuming a one standard devi-
ation change in a variable is a typical change. The most influen-
tial variable is INCOME and when it increases by one standard 
deviation the return rate increase by 4.79 points. Similar negative 
movements for inflation and unemployment increase the return 
rate by 2.67 points and 2.60 points respectively. A one standard 
deviation increase in the holding period return only increases the 
return rate by 1.80 points. Therefore, a typical movement in the 
stock market has only 38% of the effect that a typical change in 
INCOME has at the polls and 67% of the impact of a typical 
change in inflation. Although the holding period return is signifi-
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cant at the 5% level, its influence is small relative to the influ-
ence of the retrospective variables. 
Vote Share 
Next, we estimate the model when the dependent variable is 
the vote share of the incumbent President's party. Column 1 of 
Table 3, presents the results when it is estimated with the retros-
pective economic variables, the political variables, and a time 
trend. While all retrospective economic variables move in the 
expected direction, they are not as strongly significant as they 
were in the return rate equation. Still however, the estimates sug-
gest that retrospective voting is important. Unemployment and 
Income are significant at the 5% level, and inflation at the 11 % 
level. 
Column 2 estimates the equation when the two prospective 
economic variables are added. They are calculated using annual 
averages of monthly election year data. Of the two new va-
riables, only the interest rate spread is significant at the 10% lev-
el (t-statistic = 1 .45). The results are similar when only the 
months before the election are used to calculate the prospective 
variables. These results are shown in column 3. The results are 
also similar when the January to October holding period and the 
October yield are the specification employed. 
This previous estimate seems to be the one that provides the 
strongest evidence of prospective voting . SPREAD is significant 
at just under the 10% level and the holding period return is sig-
nificant at just over the 10% level. Further, the sum squared re-
sidual for this equation is the lowest of the three estimates 
discussed in Table 3. To get an idea of how influential the re-
trospective economic variables are compared to the prospective 
economic variables, we consider the effect of a one standard 
deviation change in each. To do this, we use the estimates found 
in column 3 when the p~ospective variables are considered in 
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Table 3 
Impact of Backward and Forward Looking 
Economic Variables on Vote Share of 
Incumbent Members of President's party, 1916-1996 
I-statistics (in parentheses) calculated using Newey West Heteroske-
dasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors with a lag 
truncation parameter set at 3. 
Return Rate 
Variables 2 3 4 N• 39 N•3 9 N•3 9 N• 39 
Constant 56.38 63.76 63.41 63.54 (9.14) (9.29) (9.00) (9.43) 
Time trend 0.11 0.01 0.014 0.01 (1.61) (0.10) (0. 17) (0.13) 
Income 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 (2.25) (2.13) (2.06) (2.17) 
Unemployment -0 .53 -0 .52 -0.53 -0.51 (-4.39) (-4.48) (-4.47) (-4.33) 
Inflation -0.174 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 (-1.23) (-1.08) (-0.99) (-1.03) 
REDIST -2.16 -2.28 -2.04 -1.99 (-1.00) (- 1.04) (-0.94) (-0.92) 
Incumbent President 4.14 4.07 3.99 3.96 (2.64) (2.56) (2.55) (2.48) 
Wt (Jan .-Dec .) 4.85 (I. I 3) 
SPREAD (Jan .-Dec .) 0.34 (I .45) 
Wt (Jan .-Oct) 5.48 5.52 (1.195) (1.24) 
SPREAD (Jan .-Oct.) 0.32 (1.36) 
SPREAD (Oct.) 0.34 {1.40} 
Rz 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.60 
their best light. Again assuming a one standard deviation move-
ment in a variable represents a typical change. Of all the eco-
nomic variables, a typical increase in unemployment has the 
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largest influence on the vote share, reducing it by 2.60 percen-
tage points. Typical changes in INCOME and the interest rate 
spread have almost identical effects on vote share (1.38 and 1.36 
percentage points). Such changes in the holding period return 
increase vote share by 0.88 percentage points and these changes 
in inflation decrease vote share by 0.66 percentage points. 
In the vote share equation, the evidence is mixed. While un-
employment is clearly the most influential economic variable, 
one prospective variable is more influential than two retrospec-
tive variables and the other forward looking variable is more in-
fluential than one retrospective variable. These results contrast 
with our former findings: when elections were measured with 
actual wins and loses, retrospective voting seemed to dominate 
prospective voting. In either case, the inclusion of the forward 
looking variables dropped the significance level of inflation 
while leaving the other retrospective variables pretty much unaf-
fected. This may have occurred because the interest rate spread 
includes a short term yield that talces into account the current 
inflation rate. This overlap of information given in the two va-
riables may explain why inflation's significance level dropped 
when the interest rate spread was included in the equation. 
Forecasts 
Adding variables to an equation will always increase the R-
square. However, adding variables to an equation can hurt the 
accuracy of its forecasts. Another way to test whether the for-
ward looking variables are important is to see whether including 
them in the estimated equation allows us to malce more or less 
accurate out-of-sample forecasts. The three elections after 1996 
are used to evaluate the forecasts. 
From the return rate equations in Table 2, I consider the es-
timated coefficients in the last two columns. The equation in col-
umn 5 includes the January to December holding period return, 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
A TEST FOR PROSPECTIVE VOTING IN HO USE ELECTIONS 75 
while the equation in column 6 contains no prospective econom-
ic variables. The estimated coefficients are multiplied by their 
corresp onding independent variables to calculate a predicted 
value. This was done for each of the three additional out of sam-
ple elections. The equation that includes holding period returns 
has more accurate forecasts for the 1998 and the 2000 elections. 
Howeve r, the difference in forecasts is small-only 0.65 and 
0.63 percentage points, respectively. In the 2002 election the re-
trospect ive model performs better , but here again the difference 
in forecasts is small-only 0.47 percentage points. As one would 
expect, the mean absolute deviations between the predicted and 
actual values are similar across the two equations. 10 In all, the 
forecas ts tell the same story found with the in-sample results, the 
ho lding period return adds some insight into how voters will cast 
their ballots but the level of influence is small relative to the re-
trospec tive variables. 
Overall, the success of the forecasts is mixed. In the 1998 
electi on, equation 5 predicted a return rate that was within 1.25 
points of the actual rate. The predicted value for 2000 was also 
respec table. It was only off by 5 .15 points which is one-half of a 
standard deviation of the return rate. However , both estimates 
where off by 9 percentage points in 2002. 
I did not include forecasts of vote share using the equations 
in Table 3 because the short term interest rate used in SPREAD 
only extends through the 1996 election. SPREAD was not signif-
icant in the return rate equations, but was marginally significant 
in the vote share equations. 
'
0 The mean absolute deviation is 5.34 when the holding period return is included and 
5.62 when it is not. 
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Monthly Holding Period Returns & Other Specification Tests 
We can delve more deeply into holding period returns' relev-
ance in House elections. It can be argued that people consider 
future business conditions over a short period of time when de-
ciding how to vote in an election. If so, the ten to twelve -month 
holding periods that I used to specify this variable may be too 
large. I add one-month holding periods to the equation estimated 
in column 6 of Table 2; I do so for each of the six months pre-
ceding the election. The first six columns of Table 4 report these 
estimates. In every case the retrospective economic variables 
remained significant at the 5% level. In four specifications, the 
holding period return had t-statistics less than 0.46. Two succes-
sive months had holding periods that were significant at the 5% 
level in a one tailed test. However , the July to August holding 
period is the wrong sign. Therefore , returns during these months 
seem to cancel each other out and do not suggest a strong consis-
tent pattern of stock market influence on elections. Taken as a 
whole, these results suggest prospective expectations formed in 
the six-month time period before the elections have no special 
significance . When the equation is estimated using only one 
monthly return rate at a time, these results are similar to those 
just discussed. 
Next , I consider the monthly holding period returns when 
they are added to the vote share equation . These results, shown 
in Table 5, are a bit more supportive of the notion that a stock 
market rise in the six months before the ballots are cast improves 
the election results for the president's party. However , this evi-
dence is not very strong. 
When the 6 one-month holding period return rates are added 
one at a time to the equation , only two monthly returns are sig-
nificant at the 10% level. The results are less supportive when all 
6 holding periods are estimated as part of a single equation. As 
the last colwnn of results shows, the results become mixed with 
both positive and negative signs on the coefficients. 
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Table 4 
Impact of Economic Variables on 
Re turn Rates of Incumbent Members of 
the Pre sident 's Party , 1916-1996 (n = 41) 
1-statistics (in parentheses) calculated using Newey West Heteroskedasticity and Autocor-
relation Consistent standard errors with a lag truncation parameter set at 3. 
Return Rate 
April- May- June- July- Aug.- Sept.- All 
Varia bles May June July Aug. Sept. Oct Periods 
Constant 55.80 55.96 53.94 57.99 55.87 56.02 55.03 (4.46) (4.56) (4.31) (4.74) (4.54) (4.40) (4. 15) 
Time trend 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.3 1 
0.34 0.34 0.35 
(2.63) (2.64) (2.76) (2.46) (2.65) (2.57) (2.47) 
Income 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.73 0.85 0.82 0.81 (4.29) (3.82) (4.28) (4.56) (4.29) (4.13) (4.39) 
Unemploy- -0.62 -0.59 -0.64 -0.52 -0.59 -0.61 -0.55 
ment (-2.46) (-2.19) (-2.81) (-2.29) (-2.21) (-2.34) (-2.48) 
Inflation -0.66 -0 .66 -0.57 -0.80 -0.66 -0.68 -0.65 (-2.83) (-3.02) (-2.59) (-3.19) (-2.89) (-2.76) (-2.40) 
REDIST -8.15 -8 .00 -8.64 -6.42 -8.09 -8.02 -7.68 (-2.71) (-2.36) (-2.95) (-2.9 1) (-2.53) (-2.69) (-2.96) 
Incumbent 3.38 3.36 2.67 4.47 3.35 3.51 3.36 
President (1.46) (1.44) (1.21) (2.49) (1.44) (1.56) (1.90) 
Wt -6.54 -0.21 
(April-May) (-0.35) (-0.08) 
Wt 2.25 -11.57 
(May- June) (0.08) (-OAO) 
Wt 41.73 49 .37 
(June-July) (2.47) (1.80) 
Wt -33.36 -44.10 
(Jul y-Aug .) (- 1.63) (-2.09) 
Wt 0.12 23.47 
(A ug.-Sept.) (0.00) (0.78) 
Wt 9.31 -2 1.51 
(Sept.-Oct.) (0.45) (-0.85) 
Rl 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.64 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper tests whether voters are retrospective (backward 
looking) or prospective (forward looking) when assigning elec-
toral responsibility for macroeconomic conditions. It is innova-
tive by using the stock market and yield curve to measure 
forward-looking expectations. 
When election results are measured with wins and losses, 
voters seem to weigh past economic conditions more than future 
expectations. However, voters weigh both about the same when 
the election results are measured with vote share. 
This paper finds that prospective and retrospective economic 
concerns are not mutually exclusive. Voters seem to have both. 
The debate can now center on what is the relative magnitude of 
past, versus expected future, economic conditions. 
APPENDIX A 
DATA DEFINITIONS 
Incumbents President's Party Returned: Number Returnedt +t! 
(seatst - dienumt - resumt) . Where ' 'Number Returned" is the number of 
presidential party incumbents re-elected found in the Congressional Quarterly 
Guide to Elections (through 1984) and Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
(I 986-1996).Where "Seatsi" is the number of non-vacant seats in congress t 
held by the president's party found in the Congressional Directory. "Dienumi" 
is the number ofrepresentatives in the president's party who died in°the current 
congress . "Resnumt 1" is the number of congressmen in the president's party 
who resigned to run for another elected office, to take a cabinet position, judge-
ship , or another government job . 
Presidential Party Incumbents is the percent of the two party vote re-
ceived by incumbents from the president's party when running against non-
incumbent challengers from the opposition party. Any incumbent who switched 
parties between elections was excluded from the following election. Incum-
bents from districts not reporting vote totals were excluded. Incumbents were 
identified from the Congressional Directory (64th-104th Congress). Election 
results were taken from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Elections (1916-
1984) and the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986-1996). 
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Inflation is log (,:,::~.J * 100 . Where CPI1 is the consumer price index 
in the year of the election and CPTcc-l ) is the consumer price index in the year 
be fore the election . 
Unemployment is the adult civilian unemployment rate in the year of the 
election . 
Growth in Personal Income is log (_!!!S_) * 100 Where INC1 is the INC ( t-1 ) 
personal per capita income in the year of the election and INCc,-i) is the person-
al per-capita income in the year before the election. 
Redistricting is a dummy variable equal to one for first election after a 
redistricting . 
lncpres is a dummy variable equal to one when the incumbent president is 
running for reelection . 
TREND is a linear time trend that increases by one for each observation . 
lt starts with 64, which was first Congress to face reelection in the sample pe-
riod . 
Growth in the Standard and Poor's 500 Index is (We) = [log(S&IJ) -
log (S&P)i_ 1)] * 100 . S&Pj is the average of the monthly deflated Standard 
and Poor ' s 500 Index for year j . Year j runs from January to October (I also use 
spec ifications that are 12 months long-January to December and November of 
the pre vious year to October) . Log refers to the natural log. ln the earlier sam-
ple (until 1932), the stock price index is deflated with the Warren and Pearson ' s 
Wholesale Price Index (10-13). In the later sample (after 1932), the stock price 
serie s is deflated with the Producer Price Index for All Commodities compiled 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics ,U.S. Department of Labor . 
SPREAD The difference between the AA yield and the yield on 6-month 
commercial paper. 
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